M Zeb Khan
The strained Pakistan-US relations have become a heated topic of discussion in both print and electronic media, with many analysts predicting a permanent separation between the unequal and unnatural allies. They try to relate the current situation with the end of the Cold War era when the disintegration of the USSR persuaded the US to abandon Pakistan after it had used it as a bulwark against communism. For many people repetition of the history of Pakistan’s relations with the US is needless, but I will try to analyse the unfolding events in the context of a grand strategy to adopt after the Americans quit Afghanistan.
Let us put aside all that is discussed on the TV screen and churned out in the press and use reason to understand how various events that have taken place in Pakistan since 2001 fit together into a meaningful whole. During the last months of the Bush administration, a meltdown of the US economy started. In fact, it was about to crash thanks to two costly wars and the systemic failure of the capitalist model. Despite state interventions, the economy kept on regressing with global implications. In order to avoid a total collapse, it was necessary to revisit the fundamentals of the US economic system and American foreign policy. It was in this context that during his election campaign Obama talked of a “change,”
What Obama was most worried about after becoming president was how to reconcile the conflicting public demand for better economic opportunities with the foreign policy imperatives influenced by the Pentagon and the CIA. Putting a sudden break to wars was not an easy job and so a strategy for exit from both Iraq and Afghanistan was put in place. The overriding purpose of that strategy was to save the US from disintegration by seeking a retreat without defeat attached to it.
In Iraq the strategy was relatively easier to implement than in Afghanistan. People in Iraq adjusted themselves to the new reality due to many factors, including their bitter experience with Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime, better economic prospects, and lack of organised resistance movement. The only hurdle in bringing stability to Iraq was the Iranian factor which was offset by the installation of a Shia-led government there. Afghanistan, on the other hand, offered a completely different scenario. The huge collateral damage caused by indiscriminate bombing and shelling by the US-led Nato forces pushed a vast number of Afghans to join the Taliban to avenge the deaths and atrocities. Moreover, the psychological factor of not accepting foreign occupation proved decisive in keeping the formidable enemy in check. The biggest hurdle in the way of the fulfilment of the Americans’ cherished dream of getting access to the natural resources of Central Asia via Afghanistan was created by neighbouring countries including Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. None of them was prepared to accept US hegemony in the region, but all of them were equally averse to the Taliban’s policies. One way or the other, each of those countries interfered in Afghanistan directly or through proxies to get the Taliban wiped out and for the US to be defeated. The US probably did not know for sure the extent of fear its attack on Afghanistan would generate in the region.
Now that the war in Afghanistan is taking a big toll on the US economy and on the American army’s morale, Washington is trying get out from the mess. The minimum expectations in this regard would be to leave behind a peaceful Afghanistan, and not necessarily a prosperous one. This goal cannot be achieved without the Taliban being taken on-board. The reason why the Taliban have so far not responded to offers of a negotiated solution is their successes in Afghanistan on the one hand and their lack of trust in any country on the other. The only country that can win their trust back is Pakistan, but that requires a strategic shift in Pakistan-US relations. The Taliban will start coming back to their old Pakistani benefactors after they have established that Pakistan is a US “agent” but its adversary. Creation of this perception would definitely require a standoff resulting from tragic events like CIA operative Raymond Davis’s killing people in Pakistan, repeated violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty through increased drone strikes, Osama bin Laden’s mysterious killing near Kakul and the Mohmand carnage last month.
To reinforce the perception further, Pakistan should retaliate by blocking Nato supplies, review its relationship with the US and even strike back militarily to defend its borders. After a year or so, Pakistan and the Taliban could come to terms with each other and find a power-sharing formula in Afghanistan, and thus the US would ultimately leave in honour. The drama will thus come to an end, with many questions never to be asked and never to be answered.
The writer is assistant professor at FAST-NU, Peshawar. Email: zeb.khan@nu.edu.pk
-The News
Good analysis but how does the larger picture including Iran look? As my country, the US, struggles to escape from Afghanistan (albeit perhaps retaining a useful oil pipeline and a military base or two), many of its politicians are trying to push it into a new war with Iran. From my perspective, the US is going from the frying pan into the fire.
But it seems that US pressure may be creating something new: a common interest in cooperation between Iran and Pakistan (not to mention Russia and China in the background). Suddenly, the picture begins to look like imperial overstretch. The current violence in Iraq and the embarrassing US partial retreat from that country leaving Iran smiling smugly only underscores the danger for the US of provoking an Iranian-Pakistani entente.
Do Pakistanis see such an outcome as likely or attractive?